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Abstract:This article, in reviewing the long-
running US debate on speed limits, illustrates how 
a different valuation of the trade-off between 
private mobility needs and safety concerns can 
shape transport policies. It is argued that the 
regulatory decentralization debate, together with 
the speed limit in force in each state, obey the 
social preferences and valuation given to this trade-
off. Such a view is consistent with evidence that 
higher speed limits are to be found in states with 
greater private mobility needs, even though their 
fatality rates might be among the highest in the 
country. By contrast, lower speed limits and 
supporters of a low national speed limit are to be 
found in states that show a greater concern for 
safety outcomes and which are less dependent on 
private mobility. By reviewing these events and 
examining the role played by the main actors and 
analyzing their motivations, the article identifies 
important lessons for similar future discussions on 
transport policy. 
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Introduction
National speed limit reform has been, and still is, one of the most controversial issues in 
the debate that rages in the United States’ transport sector. Indeed, the tension between 
advocates of regulatory centralization and the supporters of decentralization on the 
question regarding speed limits has not eased since the Nixon administration introduced 
the 55-mph national speed limit law in 1974. 
Since much of this controversy focuses on the safety effects of speed limits, most of the 
literature has sought to estimate the impact of changes to the speed limit on road safety 
outcomes. Unfortunately, the findings have been mixed, providing both parties with fresh 
empirical evidence to uphold their point of view. However, none of these studies has 
actually attempted to go beyond the debate on road safety in an attempt at understanding 
the confrontation itself.  
In contrast with earlier studies, the main contribution of this paper lies in the fact that it is 
the first study to analyze speed limit policy formation rather than its implications for road 
safety. In fact, this study takes the American speed limit debate to illustrate how different 
assessments of the trade-off between private mobility and safety can shape transport policy. 
Thus, this article seeks to shed some light on the factors motivating both sides to the 
debate, the determinants that usher in each stage of the reform and the role played by 
interest groups, civil platforms, scholars and political parties.  
This study suggests that more than any other element, it is the country’s regional diversity, 
ultimately reflected in the different valuation made of private mobility and safety that is the 
most important factor in the confrontation regarding speed limits.1 Similarly, it is this 
diversity that is the main contributing factor to the current speed limit levels in force today 
in the United States. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section I briefly review the 
history of speed limit reforms in the US. In the third section I identify the actors in this 
debate and their main motivations. The mixed findings of the road safety literature are very 
briefly reviewed in the fourth section, while the fifth is devoted to a discussion of the 
present-day regional characteristics that seem to have an impact on the positions adopted 
                                                
1 The different valuations made of private mobility and road safety in Speed Limit reactions following 
devolution to the states have been used in Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) and in Ashenfelter (2006) to 
estimate the value of a statistical life. The need to evaluate mobility benefits and safety in a unified context 
was raised in Haight (1994). 
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in the debate and on current speed limit levels. Finally, I discuss the lessons that can be 
learnt and present the conclusions that emerge from this controversial reform process. 
1. The history of speed limit reform 
Speed limit reform was initiated in 1974 when the Nixon Administration and Congress 
passed the National Speed Limit Law - a provision contained within the Emergency 
Highway Energy Conservation Act. As a result, a 55-mph limit was established nationwide 
and it was calculated that a 2.2% saving could be made in gasoline consumption. The Act 
was the Federal government’s response to the 1973 oil embargo launched by the Arab 
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) against those 
countries that had allied themselves with Israel in the Yom Kippur war.2 In addition to the 
embargo, the petroleum exporters raised their oil prices to western economies sharply. This 
supply shock led to a gasoline shortage in US and provided the rationale for the 
introduction of energy conservation measures.3 But as the introduction of the lower speed 
limit was the response to the diplomatic conflict between US and Arab nations, it was 
initially granted temporary status.4 However, in 1975, it would become indefinite as the 
number of traffic injuries and fatalities had been found to have declined significantly in the 
intervening period (Csere 1995; Forester, McNown and Singell 1984; and Segal 1987). 
In fact, although the speed limit law was linked to the Saudi-led oil boycott, Nixon had 
already committed himself to the centralization of many economic decisions. These 
included wage and price controls introduced in 1971 that extended far into the everyday life 
of Americans in an attempt at combating the rising stagflation of the early 70s (Yowell 
2005).5 As such, the nationalization of energy policy, and in particular that of speed limit 
regulation, was not only a response to gasoline shortages but arguably a further step along 
the path to government centralization. 
                                                
2 The Yom Kippur war was the fourth Arab-Israeli war and took place in October 1973. A coalition of Arab 
states led by Egypt and Syria jointly attacked Israel on Yom Kippur the Jewish Day of Atonement in order to 
reconquer the territories lost in the Six-Day war in 1967. Western countries and the United States participated 
with the promise of resupplying all lost tanks and planes and by sending airlift supplies. 
3 Gasoline prices were regulated by government and for this reason were never increased to meet demand, 
leading to local shortages especially in populated urban areas (Yowell 2005).
4 The legislation was to expire on June 30, 1975.
5 U.S. President Richard Nixon imposed controls on August 15, 1971. According to Bowman and Krause 
(2003), attempts at decentralization were seemingly overwhelmed by the centralizing actions of the Kennedy-
Johnson era, but ostensibly gained in intensity during the Nixon and Reagan-Bush years. 
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In this regard, the 1974 law, nicknamed “double-nickel”, represented a significant change 
both in the political status quo and in US transportation industry. Before 1974, speed limit 
regulation had been decentralized and was included among the powers reserved for the 
states.6 Speed limits dated from 1901 – with Connecticut being the first state to have 
imposed a limit - and before the reform there were huge disparities in state speed limits.7 
From the outset, the implementation of a national speed limit was controversial and 
several western states opposed the measure as contravening their individual state rights. In 
response to this opposition, the government chose to tie federal highway funds to the prior 
enactment of a 55-mph speed limit in the states and, subsequently, to the enforcement of 
the national speed limit in 1978.  
When the embargo was finally lifted and the shortage abated at America’s gas stations, 
several attempts were made by members of the House to amend the speed limit bill. 
However, for 20 years all such efforts were blocked by the Democratic leadership within 
Congress (Palmaffy 1996). With the weakening of arguments linked to energy conservation, 
the main reasons for defending the national speed limit became those of increased road 
safety and the threat of a rise in fatality rates should speed limits be raised. Indeed, the 
national speed limit was held up as being a major contributor to the decline in fatality rates, 
but a driver’s non-compliance did undermine its political validity. According to Haight 
(1998), laws that criminalize a substantial proportion of the population are undesirable and 
not likely to last. 
Thus, when the leadership and party make-up of Congress changed, the time was ripe for 
a partial reform that was introduced with the Surface Transportation and Uniform 
Relocation Act of 1987 (Yowell 2005). This law, which received the backing of the Reagan 
Administration, because of falling gasoline prices and the reduced need to save energy 
(Moore 1999),8 allowed states to raise their maximum speed limit to 65 mph on rural 
interstates. Most states immediately took advantage of this partial devolution and increased 
their limits in line with the new national speed limit. However, a number of eastern states 
chose to keep the 55-mph limit. The chronology of these reforms is shown in Table 1. 
                                                
6 The only exception to this was the Second World War emergency limit of 35 mph. 
7 Before the centralization of speed limits, Montana and Idaho had no fixed speed limit, while others such as 
Connecticut, Delaware, Rhode Island and New Jersey fixed their limit at 60 mph.   
8 I should point out that the highway authorization bill was vetoed by President Reagan who, while agreeing 
with the speed limit amendment, disagreed with other provisions contained in the bill. On April 2, 1987, the 
Congress overrode the President's veto. See Segal (1987). 
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<<Insert table 1 about there >> 
This reform did not, however, put an end to the debate on speed limit devolution. 
Western representatives continued to demand full powers to set higher limits, while 
supporters of centralization warned of fatality increases as a result of rises in speed limits. 
In fact, a number of states (Montana, Kansas, Nevada and Wyoming among others) passed 
laws that would raise their speed limits automatically when the federal cap came off. For 
this reason, when the newly-elected Republicans took control of both houses in 1994 and 
sought to devolve many functions assumed by the federal government – within the so-
called Republican revolution, one of the first powers to go was the regulation of speed 
limits (Yowell 2005). Thus, the repeal of the national speed limit was provided for under 
the National Highway Designation Act of 1995. On November 28, 1995, President Clinton 
reluctantly signed the legislation and the repeal became effective form December 8 of that 
year. (Palmafy 1996). In fact, President Clinton claimed to be “deeply disturbed” but signed 
the bill, nevertheless, to avoid stalling the funds earmarked for highway maintenance 
(Yowell 2005). Even his Secretary of Transportation, Frederico Peña, implored states, for 
reasons of safety, to respect the 65-mph limit (Kaye, Mulrine and Wu 1995). Despite these 
efforts, 33 states raised their speed limits to 70 mph or higher on certain portions of their 
roadway systems after the repeal, but at various dates as is shown in Table 2. 
<<Insert table 2 about here>> 
Today, even after devolution, the debate is still far from concluded. Hillary Clinton, 
contender for the Democratic nomination for President, endorsed a return to a 55-mph 
speed limit in 2006 during a speech to the National Press Club in Washington, DC. 
However, she recognized that the move would be too unpopular to implement nationwide. 
It is perhaps for this reason that the Obama administration has yet to propose any 
amendments in this field.  
Moreover, safety advocates, insurance companies and trucking associations are currently 
lobbying to return to a lower national speed limit. They are joined in their efforts by citizen 
platforms concerned by safety records that report more than 40,000 deaths each year in the 
United States – a third of these fatalities occurring in accidents caused by excessive speed. 
The combined effect of this lobbying has been to keep the debate very much alive.  
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2. Actors and motivations  
Speed limit reform has attracted many resolute actors during the more than 30 years of 
political and safety debate. In fact, the significance of the reform, its effects on the welfare 
of more than one interest group, and the controversy surrounding its safety and 
environmental impacts, have provided vociferous supporters in both camps with well 
shaped arguments. In this section I introduce some of these key actors and their reasons 
for joining the debate by distinguishing between interest groups, civil platforms, and 
political parties.    
3.1 Interest groups 
The highway safety lobbies wish to see a reduction in speed limits so as to improve road 
safety outcomes. In order to achieve this they seek a return to a lower, common national 
speed limit. Before repeal, when a common national limit was in force, they dedicated their 
time to blocking any reform measures that might allow higher speed limits. 
The leading supporters of a national speed limit have been the Insurance Industry -
principally via studies conducted by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS),9 the 
American Automobile Association (AAA) - who came out in favor of a 65-mph limit after 
the findings published in the studies of Lave and Elias (1994, 1997),10 although they have 
not taken any action against further increases, and the American Highway Users 
Federation.11  
Recently, the American Trucking Association has called for a national 65-mph speed 
limit, primarily, to save fuel, but also for safety reasons. Although higher speeds would 
increase their productivity, large firms understand – according to Clayton Boyce, 
spokesman for the American Trucking Association (ATA) - that the savings on insurance 
expenditure, engine wear, maintenance, and fuel far outstrip the additional miles per day 
                                                
9 The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety is an independent, nonprofit, scientific, and educational 
organization dedicated to reducing the losses - deaths, injuries, and property damage - from crashes on the 
nation's highways.
10 The American Automobile Association is a not-for-profit automobile lobby group, service organization, 
and seller of vehicle insurance.
11 The Highway Users Federation was found in 1970 following the merger of three existing organizations (the 
National Highways Users Conference, the Automotive Safety Foundation and the Auto Industries Highway 
Safety Committee).
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that might be driven.12 For these reasons, Tommy Hodges, ATA's first vice chairman, 
asked Congress before the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit of the House 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee on January 27, 2009 to enact a national speed 
limit of 65 miles per hour. 
On the other side of the table sit the independent and small transportation firms, most of 
whom are represented by the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association 
(OOIDA).13 During the truckers' strike of January 1983, one of the initial demands made by 
the strikers was for the 55-mph limit to be repealed (Segal 1987). 
Besides OOIDA, one of the most powerful lobbies within the group campaigning against 
national speed limits is the National Motorists Association (NMA),14 which devoted huge 
efforts to repealing the national speed limit. Its role in both reform measures was vital as 
James Baxter – president of the NMA – confirmed in a recruitment campaign run in June 
1995 for new members when claiming: “we're the ones that legalized 65-mph interstates in 
'87 and are pushing the present NMSL repeal”. In fact, as he recognizes in a recent 
interview published in automobilemag.com, the NMA “was founded to repeal the 55-mph 
national maximum speed limit” and “speed limit and speed-limit-related topics have always 
been among our primary areas of involvement”.15 It is perhaps for this reason that the 
number of association members fell by half following repeal. In order to achieve its goals 
the NMA can call on dedicated volunteers to monitor, publicize, and lobby critical motorist 
issues.16 
3.2 Civil platforms 
Civil platforms and influential advocacy groups also defended the need to avoid raising 
speed limits in the United States. Along with Ralph Nader, one of the most important 
figures in this fight was the lawyer Joan Claybrook, who served as head of the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration during the Carter Administration and led the Public 
                                                
12 Clayton Boyce outlined ATA’s position on national speed limits in US News on March 26, 2008.  
13 The Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association is the international trade association representing 
the interests of independent owner-operators and professional drivers on all issues that affect truckers since 
1973.
14 The National Motorists Association was founded in 1982 to represent and protect the interests of 
motorists. 
15 Interview published on 13 August, 2009 in www.automobilemag.com
16 This statement is used by NMA in its official webpage to attract new members. See 
www.motorists.org/memberbenefits 
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Citizen group between 1982 and 2008.17 Mention should also be made of Judie Stone, the 
president of Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, and other platforms including the 
Center for Auto Safety. All these civil platforms played a key role in shaping public opinion 
against the 1995 repeal and increases in the speed limit. 
3.3 Political parties 
As is apparent from the historical review above, the political parties played an important 
role in establishing speed limits. One party that has devoted more efforts than most to this 
issue is the Green Party. This party, and its leader during the repeal process, Ralph Nader, 
argued that higher speed limits and the repeal of the 55-mph national limit were an assault 
on the sanctity of human life. However, Green Party representation in the Congress was - 
and remains - scarce and its stance on the issue had little political influence on reform. 
By contrast, the position adopted by the Democratic Party has been much more 
influential in developments associated with speed limit reforms. In fact, it is the leading 
party giving its support to lower speed limits on safety and environmental grounds. Its 
position on this issue and the majority it enjoyed in Congress led to the blocking of moves 
by representatives of states in the west to introduce reforms during the 80s, although they 
were unable to stop the first partial devolution in 1987 following years of well-documented 
non-compliance. Some years later, now with a Republican majority in both houses (the first 
time this had happened since 1952), the Clinton Administration was adamant in its 
rejection of the repeal, but reluctantly had to accept the overturn as outlined above. In fact, 
Clinton sought to influence individual state decisions through the central department of 
transportation. 
By the 80s growing concern among the Republican Party became evident, particularly in 
the middle of that decade when several states were found to be in non-compliance with the 
national speed limit. In fact, in his 1980 election campaign, President Reagan promised to 
have it abolished, but he was to take a somewhat more relaxed attitude when he took 
office.18 An excellent illustration of conservative think tank opinion is provided by Copulos 
                                                
17 Public Citizen is a nonpartisan, nonprofit public interest advocacy organization founded by Ralph Nader in 
1971 in order to guarantee the individual’s right to safe products, a healthy environment and workplace, fair 
trade, and clean and safe energy sources.
18 See article by Paul Grimes published in New York Times on December 26, 1982. (www.nytimes.com) 
 
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2009                                                    Working Papers 2009/26, 26pages
 9
(1986). The report highlights the effects of increasing non-compliance and urges congress 
to recognize that the 55-mph limit was not a major factor in saving either lives or fuel, 
while the costs incurred by slower journeys were considerable. The national speed limit law 
was presented as violating state rights, and was used as a symbol of the commitment on the 
part of the new Republican majority to limit federal government. Additionally, the law was 
seen to be undermining the freedom of choice of American citizens and was indicative of 
Federal government control over them – two key values typically defended by the 
Republican Party in their political platforms. 
Indeed, Republican support for repeal was compelling in the Senate, with only 3 of its 54 
senators (5%) casting their vote against. By contrast, opinion was more divided among the 
Democrats, with 14 out of 46 (30%) voting in favor of repeal. As shown in Table 3, the 
national speed limit that had stood for 21 years was repealed by a majority of 30 votes. 
Of greater interest than the overall distribution of votes in the Senate was the position 
taken by those senators that did not vote according to the expected party line, i.e., the 
Republicans that voted against repeal and the Democrats that voted in favor. An analysis, 
however, of their State of origin shows that individual decisions were probably motivated 
by the constituency they represented. Table 4 lists the names of these Democrat senators 
and the state in which they were elected. 
As can be seen, most of these senators represented low population density states, which 
were some of the first to raise the speed limit following repeal. Interesting cases are 
provided by the votes cast in favor by the senators of Lousiana and Nevada, as well as 
those cast by the senators of Montana, New Mexico and Vermont. Exceptions to this 
pattern are provided by the voting behavior of Sen. Kerry in Massachusetts and Sen. 
Graham in Florida. 
Among the three Republicans that voted against the repeal, Sens. Chafee, Hatfield and 
Warner were elected in Rhode Island, Oregon and Virginia respectively, three states with 
low speed limits that did not raise the limit following the repeal. 
The decisive Republican action taken in the Senate on this issue reflects the party’s role in 
representing those values that they felt were coming under direct “attack” by maintaining a 
low national speed limit. This, after all, is the party that defends limited federal government 
and individual liberty over government control.  
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3.4 Reasoning 
Both sides to the debate, the supporters of low national speed limits and those favoring 
repeal, held a variety of motives for the positions they adopted. These arguments are 
summarized below: 
a) The main grounds for the defense of lower speed limits were the following: 
- Road Safety: lives are saved by reducing the incidence and severity of road 
accidents. 
- Lower rates of automobile insurance: higher speed limits lead to more accidents 
and, thus, to higher auto insurance rates for drivers. 
- Environmental concerns: vehicle emissions are cut. 
- Economic issues: consumers’ save money at the pump thanks to increased fuel 
efficiency, and consequent fuel savings. 
- Foreign Policy: Reduces dependence on foreign oil by reducing demand. 
- Benefits of State Uniformity: uniform national speed limit is useful given that 
people often drive in states other than their own and change residence from one 
state to another 
b) By contrast, the reasons held by those favoring repeal and higher speed limits can be 
summarized as follows: 
- Centralization: The national speed limit violated the right of states to set their own 
limits as they saw fit. Decisions regarding speed limits should be taken by state 
officials who best understand traffic and road conditions in a particular state. 
- Time savings: Higher speeds favor time savings and lower the cost of road 
transportation. According to Moore (1999), Americans saved 200 million man- 
hours in terms of the reduction in time spent on the road after the repeal.  
- Engineering: Roads were designed for higher speeds than those permitted by the 
national speed limit. 
- Loss of personal freedom: Personal mobility and driving are considered an essential 
component of freedom, especially in the western states with their lower rates of 
urbanization. 
- Regionally Discriminatory: Westerners contend that they must frequently travel on 
roads that stretch for hundreds of miles across open country, with good visibility 
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and light traffic, and that a 55-mph limit under such circumstances is an 
unnecessary and burdensome restriction (Segal 1987). 
- Average vs. Variance: Fatality rates are strongly related to the variation in speed 
between vehicles. Variance kills. Therefore, what matters most in setting a speed 
limit is choosing one that people will obey, hence reducing the variance in the 
velocity of vehicles (Lave 1985). 
 
3. Road safety evidence  
 
Although initially the national speed limit was a temporary measure introduced to meet 
goals of energy conservation, its impact on the road fatality rate following its enactment 
provided the rationale for making the law indefinite. However, its effectiveness in reducing 
road fatalities and the threats involved from increasing the speed limit were continuously 
challenged by academic studies. Similarly, though, other studies were conducted, especially 
after 1987, to demonstrate the positive impact of the 55-mph limit and the undesirable 
results that would derive from speed limit increases. Thus, the road safety literature 
presents mixed findings on the effects of speed limits and road safety, a fact that was to 
push the two sides to the debate further apart. Table 5 summarizes some of the more 
influential studies that were conducted, the speed limit reform that was tested and their 
main findings. 
<<Insert table 5 about here >> 
Two reasons seem to account for these mixed findings. First, as claimed by Friedman et 
al. (2009) - one of the most recent studies examining the long-term effects of speed limit 
increases after the 1995 reform, they are attributable to the fact that most studies were 
restricted to short post-intervention periods and a small number of states. By contrast, 
Haight (1998) interprets these mixed results from a political viewpoint arguing that scholars 
have too frequently played a partisan role in the political battle between parties and civil 
advocates.  
Perhaps this latter opinion helps clarify the confused picture that is derived from the 
empirical studies. The speed limit issue is in essence a political question and, for this 
reason, it is virtually impossible to identify one study that has not been designed to support 
one side of the debate or the other (Haight 1998). Therefore, academic studies have been 
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used as weapons in this battle and have become an essential source of support for both 
sides. 
4. Economic and geographic determinants of speed limit laws 
Having reviewed the roles played by interest groups, civil platforms and political parties, 
and having examined the mixed findings presented in the literature on road safety, we need 
now to understand the motives underpinning this controversy. The examination of the 
political positions adopted by Senators voting against party lines pointed to the importance 
of their state of origin. Indeed, a geographical and demographic comparison between 
adopting and non-adopting states provides us with interesting results. Table 6 
distinguishes between states with speed limits over 65 mph and those that did not raise 
their limits over 65 mph.  
<<Insert table 6 about here>> 
As can be seen, the states that adopted higher speed limits present relatively low 
population densities and levels of urbanization, which seem to have a negative influence on 
the number of private vehicle miles driven per inhabitant as is highlighted in the third 
column of Table 6. By contrast, their income is lower than that of inhabitants in non-
adopting states. In addition, their fatality rates per 100 million miles driven in the period 
immediately prior to repeal were higher, and remain so according to the latest available data 
(Fatality Accident Reporting System 2007).19 The same pattern is found when we focus 
solely on those states that took immediate action following the repeal. Here, we should 
note that increased fatality rates did not prevent these states from raising their speed limits. 
In order to examine more closely the relationship between these variables and speed limit 
laws it is useful to provide non-parametric median spline regressions. Non-parametric 
analysis using spline techniques is a suitable tool for examining data in which the functional 
form relating the variables of interest is unclear.20 By applying this technique I am able to 
confirm the decreasing relationship between population density and speed limits (Figure 
                                                
19 We use the fatality rate immediately prior to the repeal to avoid endogeneity problems, since speed limits 
can have an impact on fatality rates. The same consideration is made when including data related to private 
vehicle miles driven per inhabitant. An examination of current data does not significantly change these 
results. 
20 More specifically, spline regressions provide polynomial functions by segments, where all segments are 
interconnected at points or knots. These knots are not necessarily equidistant, but rather the distance 
separating them depends on the functional relationship being fitted in each case. Spline regressions are 
particularly useful when some of the variables involved are discrete, which is the case here with speed limits.
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1). However, it should be noted that this decreasing relationship is only pronounced until a 
density level of around 100 is reached. Therefore, the greater the population raises, the 
lower the speed limit that is set. Moreover, there is a marked turning point – when the 
density is 100 or higher – at which speed limits remain fixed at 65 mph even if the 
population increases in density. Thus, states with a population density below 100 
inhab/km2 can be expected to have enacted higher speed limit laws, while states with a 
higher density appear to be the ones that choose not to increase their 65-mph limit.  
Of the 40 states with densities lower than 100 inhab/km2, 31 currently report speed limits 
higher than 65 mph. By contrast, only 1 – the State of Florida - of the ten states with a 
higher density enacted a higher speed limit. Likewise, rates of urbanization are also 
negatively related to speed limit levels until a turning point is reached at around 15%. 
Beyond this level, higher rates of urbanization do not affect the 65-mph speed limit.  
  <<Insert Figures 1 about here >> 
A further characteristic of states adopting higher speed limits is that of state size. The 
number of square miles is an important determinant of this policy as illustrated by the third 
graph in Figure 1 where we see a clearly increasing relationship between state size and the 
speed limit. However, the trend stabilizes at around 100,000 square miles.21 As is well 
known, large states tend to have lower population densities and levels of urbanization. For 
these reasons, we can expect a greater dependency on private mobility. In fact, when we 
run the same spline relating private miles driven per capita to speed limits this gently 
increasing pattern is confirmed (see graph 4 in Figure 1). 
To highlight this geographical importance further, additional spline regressions were run 
relating speed limits to geographic longitude and latitude. In the case of longitude, the 
results show a readily identifiable inverted U-shape relationship, which means that states on 
both coasts seem to present - on average - lower speed limits than those set by central 
states. The maximum point in this inverted U-shape function occurs at a longitude of 
around 100º, where we find the states of Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, South 
Dakota and North Dakota. Less clear, however, is the result associated with latitude. The 
                                                
21 The three largest states (Alaska, California and Texas) have been omitted from this regression, since they 
are significant outliers in terms of their size. Given that they are the only states with an area greater than 
150,000 square miles, they would distort the final segment of the spline function, and even more so because 
they present very different speed limits. 
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figure presents two peaks in southern and northern states, whereas the pattern for the 
central states is not clear. 
A neighbor effect also seems to have an influence on speed limit decisions, probably 
because neighboring states tend to share similar demographic characteristics and, therefore, 
similar preferences as regards private mobility options. Moreover, it is common that 
neighboring states adopt the same policies. To illustrate this point I include one final spline 
regression in Figure 1. This graph shows that those states for whom more than one third 
of their neighbors register a current speed limit higher than 65 mph, also present a higher 
speed limit. A national map is likewise a useful illustration of this tendency (Figure 2). The 
map shows that there would seem to have been a common response based on geographical 
area. The map highlights regional clusters, which suggests that the decision taken by any 
one state might be affected by the decisions taken by their neighbors in addition to the fact 
that they share similar demographic and economic characteristics. Thus, most states 
retaining the 65 mph limit are on the north-eastern coast, while the western states, with the 
exception of the coastal states themselves, have the highest speed limits. Most southern 
and mid-western states also have speed limits above 65 mph, but never higher than 70 
mph. These results are consistent with previous spline regressions, confirming the inverted 
U-shape relationship with geographical longitude. The map also illustrates the fact that 
latitude does not seem to play a role, given that at almost all latitudes different speed limits 
are in place.  
Interestingly, the correlation between current speed limits and the average speed limit of 
neighbor states is 0.76, which is a good indication of the regional importance in the debate 
on speed limit adoption.  
<<Insert Figure 2 about here >> 
Interestingly these groups of states present similar relationships between their levels of 
population density and other key elements regarding mobility and road safety. The 
regression between density and private vehicle miles driven, and the relationship between 
the fatality rate immediately prior to the repeal and population density are shown in Figure 
3. As can be seen, there is a decreasing relationship in both instances. In the case of state 
size, regressions with private miles driven, on the one hand, and with the fatality rate per 
miles driven, on the other, present the expected positive relationships.  
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<< Insert Figure 3 about here >> 
Thus, speed limit laws and individual state reactions to the repeal are well accounted for 
by demographic, geographic and socio-economic variables. Furthermore, we have seen that 
states with low levels of urbanization were more likely to set higher speed limits, even 
though they recorded higher fatality rates.  
To a certain extent, these geographic and demographic characteristics illustrate how 
different states value the underlying trade-off in the speed limit debate, namely the 
preference for private time savings or road safety. The need for private mobility in areas of 
low urbanization, which usually goes hand in hand with ideals of individualism and liberty, 
seems to explain why western and southern states have traditionally defended their right to 
set higher speed limits despite their poor road safety outcomes. It is this preference for 
greater mobility over safety - which derives from their geographic and demographic 
characteristics – that seems to have determined their response to the controversial national 
55-mph speed limit and explains their current laws. 
Proof of the importance of these preferences is the path dependence found between past 
speed limits – those in place before the establishment of the national speed limit - and 
current speed limits. Many states - 21 out of 50 - returned three decades later to the state 
speed limit in operation before the implementation of the 55-mph national speed limit. If 
we compute the correlation between previous state speed limits and current limits we find a 
coefficient of 0.44. This result would seem to confirm that preferences do not change easily 
over time. Similarly, on the basis of the regional clusters identified above, preferences 
across border states do not change easily either. 
5. Lessons and discussion 
 
The historical review undertaken above, the analysis of the key actors and their 
motivations in the debate, and the description of the characteristics of the adopting states 
enable us to identify the lessons that can be learnt, to my way of thinking, from the 
American speed limit debate. While these lessons shed some light on past events, they also 
provide guidelines for future discussions in other policy areas. 
 
1. Reducing speed limits in an attempt at cutting energy consumption was not 
particularly successful according to Government estimates published in the early 
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80s. The saving was calculated at a figure no higher than 2% and the general 
conclusion was that reducing speed limits had only a limited impact in terms of 
wider conservation goals. Recently, mounting environmental concerns have 
brought the speed limit debate back onto the political agenda given that vehicle 
emissions appear to be related to speed limits. Although they would seem to be 
more closely associated with congestion in urban environments. Furthermore, car 
technology has improved markedly since the early 80s and so any speed limit 
reductions would probably only have a limited impact on the environment. This 
will become only too apparent with the expansion of the fleet of electric cars in the 
future. Rather than speed limits, which only affect the average and the variance of 
driving speeds, vehicle emissions and energy consumption are more closely related 
to overall vehicle usage and car stops and goes – attributable primarily to traffic 
lights and congestion. For this reason, other tools such as congestion tolls or higher 
fuel taxes might address the problem more adequately, but they obviously imply 
certain political obstacles given their lack of acceptability (Albalate and Bel 2009). 
2.  In the case of such controversial issues as that of US speed limits, it is not unusual 
to find strong empirical and theoretical evidence supporting both sides of the 
debate. As Haight (1998) highlights, most studies seem to have been conducted 
with the purpose of supporting one side in the ideological dispute. Consequently, 
academic and government studies, rather than shedding light on the issue, tend to 
create confusion and prevent a rapprochement. That said, however, having 
reviewed the most recent and robust literature on the long-term impact of speed 
limits, it seems reasonable to conclude that the effect on fatality rates following the 
repeal of the national speed limit has been small. Considering the problem in the 
short term, it also seems reasonable to conclude that there have been some 
increases in fatalities immediately following the introduction of higher limits, but 
that these have diminished in the long run. 
3. Regional heterogeneity, geographic diversity and different assessments and values 
regarding safety and travel costs have been the main factors in this long-running 
controversy, even more markedly so than the positions adopted by interest groups 
and the main political parties. The centralization of the speed limit, which reduced 
speed limits across the US, failed to account for the country’s intrinsic diversity. It 
is perhaps only natural to expect opposition and discontent when a law seeks to 
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homogenize a whole territory, particularly when it is so diverse and the law directly 
impinges on the citizens’ values and everyday lives. According to the previous 
discussion, it would seem sensible to allow states to set their own speed limits. 
Indeed, the proximity to their constituents means they are in a better position to 
assess local values and preferences. This would seem to be the view held by Hillary 
Clinton when she claims “there are things that can be done […] most of the 
country where 55 miles an hour doesn't seem like a burden, we have that. In the 
rest of the country, inflate your tires before you head off into the sunset". If 
diversity is not taken into consideration, the controversy will never come to an end 
as it directly affects social preferences. 
4. Since preferences and social values remain stable over time and – to some extent- 
across bordering states, even after years of centralization, devolution results in the 
adoption of earlier state laws, i.e., those that seem to best match their social values. 
This path dependence would seem to have been a key determinant of policy in this 
instance. When social preferences determine policy formation, time dependence 
and regional effects can be expected. 
5. In spite of this, it should be borne in mind that the states that decided to raise their 
limits immediately to speeds above 65 mph were, precisely, those with the highest 
fatality rates in the period immediately prior to the repeal. In other words these 
states, in line with the arguments presented in this article, attached greater value to 
mobility and travel time than to safety outcomes, which in these instance were of 
some concern in comparison with the national mean. In addition, these were the 
states with greater private mobility reflecting their demographic and geographical 
characteristics. And so it is the main contention of this article that the social 
evaluation of the trade-off between private mobility and safety was the main factor 
in this dispute. 
6. Once more, speed limit repeal is further proof of the fact that laws, regardless of 
the provisions they hold, cannot last if the levels of non-compliance are as high as 
reported,. 
7. Although speed limit lobbyists, including trucking and motorist associations, 
consumer advocacy groups and insurance companies, have been active, their actual 
contribution to the eventual repeal was probably less important than the role played 
by the assessment and evaluation of private mobility across the country. Likewise, 
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the major political parties entered the fray with varying degrees of cross-party 
commitment. While the Republicans had opposed a national speed limit since the 
80s, the Democrats were more divided on the issue, especially in the vote taken in 
the Senate in 1995. However, once again, this division would seem to have been 
conditioned by individual constituency characteristics in most cases. 
The American speed limit war has cooled in recent years. However, rising concern about 
road safety and the need to meet certain environmental objectives keep the 30-year-old 
debate alive. Proposals to Congress to study the reintroduction of a national speed limit 
from the Republican Senator John Warner (R-VA),22 similar demands from the leading 
trucking association (ATA) and a Democratic majority in the congress in tandem with 
Barack Obama’s administration, mean that it is impossible to rule out another stage in this 
long-running dispute, which has established itself as the most controversial political and 
academic discussion in the American transportation sector over the last few decades.  
In short, the American speed limit war provides an excellent illustration of how different 
valuations of private mobility and safety can shape transport policy. The lessons that can be 
drawn from this debate should be of great use in future policy debates. 
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Table 1. The timing of interstate speed limit reforms 





Surface Transportation and 
Uniform Relocation 
Assistance Act 
National Highway  
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Act 
Motivation Reduce fuel consumption End of energy shortages Devolution to States 
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No Federal Speed Limit 



































Table 2. Current interstate speed limits by State, 2009. 
State Rural Trucks Urban 
 
Change to current  
Rural speed limit 
Alabama 70 70 60 
 
05/21/96 
Alaska 65 65 65 01/15/88 
Arizona 75 75 65 12/08/95 
Arkansas 70 65 65 08/19/96 
California 70 55 65 01/08/96 
Colorado 75 75 55-65 06/24/96 
Connecticut 65 65 45-55 10/01/98 
Delaware 65 65 50-55 01/17/96 
District of Columbia - - 50 - 
Florida 70 70 70 04/08/96 
Georgia 70 70 55-65 07/01/96 
Hawaii 55-60 55-60 50 No action 
Idaho 75 65 65 05/01/96 
Illinois 65 55 55 01/25/96 
Indiana 70 65 50-55 07/01/05 
Iowa 70 70 55-65 07/01/05 
Kansas 70 70 65 03/07/96 
Kentucky 70 70 55 07/10/07 
Louisiana 70 70 60 08/15/97 
Maine 65 65 55 06/12/87 
Maryland 65 65 55-60 07/01/95 
Massachusetts 65 65 55 01/05/92 
Michigan 70 60 70 08/01/96 
Minnesota 70 70 45-60 07/01/97 
Mississippi 70 70 60-70 02/29/96 
Missouri 70 70 55-65 03/13/96 
Montana 75 65 65 05/28/99 
Nebraska 75 75 60 09/01/96 
Nevada 75 75 65 12/08/95 
New Hampshire 65 65 55 04/16/87 
New Jersey 65 65 55 01/19/98 
New Mexico 75 75 65-75 05/15/96 
New York 65 65 50-55 08/01/95 
North Carolina 75 75 65 08/05/96 
North Dakota 75 75 55-75 08/01/03 
Ohio 65 65 65 07/01/09 
Oklahoma 70-75 70-75 55-65 08/29/96 
Oregon 65 55 55-60 06/27/87 
Pennsylvania 65 65 55 07/13/95 
Rhode Island 65 65 55 05/12/96 
South Carolina 70 70 60 04/30/99 
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South Dakota 75 75 65 04/01/96 
Tennessee 70 70 55 03/25/98 
Texas 70-80 70 60 02/13/08 
Utah 80 75 65 05/01/96 
Vermont 65 65 55 04/21/87 
Virginia 70 65 55-65 07/01/06, 
Washington 70 60 60 03/15/96 
West Virginia 70 70 50-60 08/25/97 
Wisconsin 65 65 55-65 06/17/87 
Wyoming 75 75 60 12/08/95 






Table 3. Voting behavior in the Senate on national speed limit repeal, June 21, 1995. 
  Yes No 
Total 65 35 
Republicans 51 3 
Democrats 14 32 
 
 





Democrat Senator  
favoring the repeal 
 
Second Democrat Senator 
 favoring the repeal 
Florida 
1/1 
Graham (D-FL) - 
Georgia 
1/1 
Nunn (D-GA) - 
Hawaii 
1/2 
Inouye (D-HI) - 
Louisiana 
2/2 
Breaux (D-LA) Johnston (D-LA) 
Massachusetts 
1/2 
Kerry (D-MA) - 
Montana 
1/1 
Baucus (D-MT) - 
Nevada 
2/2 
Bryan (D-NV) Reid (D-NV) 
New Mexico 
1/1 
Bingaman (D-NM) - 
North Dakota 
1/2 
Conrad (D-ND) - 
Vermont 
1/1 
Leahy (D-VT) - 
Virginia 
1/1 
Robb (D-VA) - 
Wisconsin 
1/2 
Feingold (D-WI) - 
 
 










Table 5. Summary of selected US studies on the relationship between speed limits and 
safety. 
Study Reform Findings 
Lave (1985) 1974 No statistically discernible relationship 
between the fatality rate and average speed 
Baum et al. (1989) 1987 Increased fatalities 
Garber and Graham (1990) 1987 Mixed results depending on the state 
Chang and Paniati (1990) 1987 Predicted fatalities were greater than actual 
fatalities, but in most states no statistical 
significance 
Wagenaar, Streff, and Schultz 
(1990) 
1987 Increase in fatalities and serious injuries 
Lave and Elias (1994) 1987 Reduced fatalities 
McCarthy (1994) 1987 No system-wide effects on total, fatal, 
injury-related or property damage 
accidents. 
Lave and Elias (1997) 1987 Reduced fatality rate 
Rock (1995) 1987 Rise in number of accidents, deaths and 
injuries 
Farmer et al. (1999) 
 
1995 Increased fatality rates 
Houston (1999) 1987 Increased fatality rates on rural interstate 
highways 
Greenstone (2002) 1987 Increased fatality rate on rural interstates, 
but reduction on non-interstates 
Dee and Sela (2003) 
 
1987/1995 No overall effects on fatality rates, 
but heterogeneous impacts by gender and 
age 
Bartle et al. (2003) 1995 Increase in the number of deaths 
Vernon et al. (2004) 1995 No overall effect on crash occurrence 
Yowell (2005) 1995 No effects on fatality rates 
Friedman et al. (2009) 1995 Increase in road fatalities attributable to 
higher speed limits 
 
Table 6. Demographic and economic characteristics of States 

















Current Speed Limit       
>65 31.1 4.1 1,395 1.98 1.57 21,123 
 65 139.9 12.07 762 1.43 1.12 25,182 
Action after Repeal    
Reaction 1995-1997 44.8 5.1 1,284 1.92 1.52 21,529 









Figure 1. Non-parametric Median Spline Regressions. Relationship between speed limits and 
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Figure 3. Regression fits: Relationship between Population density and private vehicle miles 
driven. Relationship between Population density and road fatality rate per 100 miles driven.   
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